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Abstract—Mobile Cloud Computing is a form of collaborative
decentralized Cloud which allows mobile devices to unload
computation to a local Cloud formed by mobile and static devices.
Mobile Cloud Computing provides a better service to latency
sensitive applications, due to its physical proximity to the VM
host. However, in these systems, the problem of free riding
users becomes more acute, for the heterogeneity of devices (from
smartphones to private servers) makes the gap of contributed
resources much larger. In this work, we analyze the use of
incentives for Mobile Clouds, and propose a new auction system
adapted to the high dynamism and heterogeneity of these systems.
We compare our solution to other existing auctions systems in a
Mobile Cloud use case, and show the suitability of our solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has become a dominant solution for
prompt and on-demand leasing of computing resources. In
this technology, the architecture of public cloud datacenters
where data are centralized is commonly deployed. However,
many alternatives to the datacenter-centralized vision of the
Cloud exist in literature. This is the case of Social Clouds.
The definition of a Social Cloud (SC) - ”a resource and
service sharing framework utilizing relationships established
between members of a social network” - was firstly proposed
by [3]. In these networks the decentralization of resources
follows an overall pattern of interest. This makes SC especially
relevant in nowadays ever-growing Internet. given that the
system should be able to absorb the amount of computation
and data generated in the system and users’ devices most
of the time. An implementation of SC is found on Mobile
Computing (MC). These are infrastructures composed of both
static and mobile devices, born to address the limitations of
mobile devices in terms of resources and connectivity [6]. MC
improves resource-hungry mobile services, by offloading data
and computation into the Cloud [6].
However, decentralized clouds may be unfair when some
users contribute more resources than others. These users, called
free riders, are estimated to account for the largest percentage
of users in collaborative networks [9]. The unfairness asso-
ciated with the free riding problem represent an obstacle to
the adoption of a collaborative technology. In our problem,
to incentivize the use of MCs it is necessary to extend the
concept of lease. A lease is a contractual arrangement between
an entity, which rent part of its computational power, and a
group of users, which offers a payment in return. In a MC
lease the entity offering the computational power is formed by
a group of users, called sellers. The sellers rent part of their
resources to host the Virtual Machines (VMs) used to provide
the service. On the other hand, the rest of users, called buyers,
pay the sellers for hosting the VM. As a consequence to this
new concept of lease, a pricing system is required.
Existing solutions are mainly based on two leasing models:
fixed and negotiated pricing. In a fixed price system, a seller
offers its resources at a specific cost, and the buyers match
it. In a negotiated price system, the price of the resource is
established by direct competition (auction) between buyers and
sellers. In this work, we propose a multi-sided auction system,
where the user becomes both buyer and seller, auctioning
on other users as needed. Furthermore, we propose an open
auction system where the application provider supervises the
process, and has the possibility of bidding along with one or
more users if the expected result of the auction is unfair to
other users.
In this paper we target interactive MC applications, with
multiple active users. In those, the VM hosting the application
is placed in a device which suits every user using it. However,
the hosting device may not make use of the application or be
willing to share its resources. To solve this issue, an incentives
system is necessary for the users to be more willing to lending
resources. This incentive is recorded in a lease contract, which
is signed between the host and the users, fitting all actors
involved. To our knowledge, no other work has researched
on the use of incentives in the case of MCs up to the moment
of writing this paper.
The remaining of the paper is as follows. Section II shows
the background and a classification on existing solutions. In
Section III, the use case scenario is introduced. Our solution
is explained in Section IV, while the result from our experi-
mentation is shown on V. Finally, Section VI draws our main
conclusions and future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Decentralized systems have set lately the focus of research
on Mobile Clouds (MCs), due to properties like low latency
to the user, reduced energy consumption and robustness [6].
MCs are infrastructures composed of both static and mobile
devices, such as PCs and smartphones, but also domestic
servers and components from smart-cities’ infrastructures such
as routers or specific purpose hardware. These clouds eliminate
the need of a datacenter, allocating the computation in the user
and/or network devices. They provide a very small latency and
high energy efficiency [3], [5], due to the small geographical
distance between users.
We review existing lease-provision systems and investi-
gated their adequacy to MC. We identified three types of
leases:
• 1 to 1 (Standard lease provision): The conditions of
the lease are established beforehand through a Service-
Level Agreement (SLA). Through a SLA, a device
commits to lending a part of its resources to provide
a negotiated service. Examples of this approach can
be found in IaaS providers such as Amazon AWS [2]
or Google Cloud [8]. This solution is, however, too
rigid for dynamic environments, due to issues such as
predefined slots of time or dependence on the SLA
offered by the seller, which is caused by lack of
competition.
• 1 to N (Simple Auction): Simple auctions start with
a SLA over which the price is negotiated. They are
either direct or reverse. In the direct approach (one
seller, multiple buyers) the SLA is offered beforehand
by the seller and the buyer offering the highest price
gets it. In the reverse one (one buyer, multiple sellers)
the SLA is offered beforehand by the buyer and the
seller requesting the smallest price to fulfill it gains
the auction. In a direct 1 to N auction, the seller
remains unchanged and values a lease according to the
maximum amount payable for it, while in a reverse
one an unchanged buyer values it to the minimum
pay. A known example of a direct 1 to N approach is
Amazon’s EC2 Spot Instances [1] and existing works
on MC such as [10], [11]. This type of lease is less
rigid than the standard one. However, these approaches
do not encourage competition either between buyers
or sellers.
• N to N (Double Auction): Double auctions encour-
age competition both in-between multiple buyers and
sellers. It can be described as a combination of direct
and reverse auctions, where the SLA and price are
decided according to the market offer [13], [15], [16].
Double auctions are the most adaptable solution to
the MC context, because the conditions are always
set dynamically based on the offer and demand.
All leases, independently from its type, are unfair when
one of the buyers possesses more monetary resources than the
rest, unbalancing the market. To face this circumstance, several
buyers may join efforts to gain an auction against more wealthy
opponents, called a group auction. A specific kind of group
auctions are group-buying auctions, in which a special price is
promised to buyers under the condition of reaching a minimum
bid [14]. Bids are either informed (buyers know about the
value given to the service by other participants) or blind (no
information about other bids are known to buyers). Group
auctions are of special importance for the targeted applications,
where multiple buyers collaborate on the same instance of the
application.
III. SCENARIO: NEIGHBORHOOD APPLICATIONS ON
MOBILE CLOUDS
We have chosen to study incentives to the use of neigh-
borhood interactive applications deployed on a MC archi-
tecture, such as described in [4]. In this scenario multiple
users collaborate using applications in a MC restricted to a
neighborhood. That is, users are all located inside the same
neighborhood and use services applications adapted to this
neighborhood, as in real-life applications such as [7]. We
also assume a smart-city infrastructure in the neighborhood.
This infrastructure provides data about the area of use to the
neighbors. Every node inside this neighborhood is a candidate
to be used as host for a VM (including network and smart-city
equipment and mobile devices). We understand by node any
device working in the network, which an application layer,
such as computers, smartphones, domestic or ISP routers or
specific purpose hardware for smartcities infrastructures.
For each instance of a service running in the neighborhood,
an overlay network called microcloud is created, as defined
in [5]. Different roles are dynamically assigned to nodes:
• Service Manager (SM), which controls the life-cycle
of the application. It acts as the auctioning authority.
• Service Provider (SP), which hosts the application
backend in the form of a VM.
• Client, which makes use of the service. Both SM and
SP can be at the same time clients of the microcloud.
Additionally, two super nodes are assigned to the smart-city
infrastructure. This roles are Base Provider, which backs-up
data, and the Base Manager, for the management of the overall
infrastructure (management of microclouds). The backing-up
process is done through a snapshot of the VM. The copies of
the VM are never accessed by clients, and do not interfere
with the system. Thus, there still exist no replication of active
data.
Confining the traffic to the neighborhood, this architecture
eliminates replication (since only one copy of the data is active
at a given moment, hosted in the SP). Also, it reduces the
amount of data traveling across the network (as a consequence
of the elimination of the replication and the utilization of
efficient connections); and consumes less energy and provides
a better Quality of Experience (QoE) than in an architecture
where the VM is hosted in a datacenter.
The characteristics of this scenario are:
Highly dynamic: The mobility of the different mobile
nodes produce a highly dynamic system. Thus, auctions are
started on demand by buyers (clients).
Client orientation: The system needs to take into account
different users requirements (such as CPUs, RAM, storage
space or expected QoE). Every client might request different
conditions for the SLAs.
Minimum satisfaction: End-users’ QoE is a main concern
in the design of the system, as interactive applications are con-
sidered. Thus, a minimum satisfaction needs to be guaranteed
to nodes.
Credit mobility: Users’ credit can be used to pay for
different applications in different microclouds. If users move
between neighborhoods, their credit moves along with them.
IV. OUR APPROACH: P2P AUCTION WITH EXTERNAL
SUPERVISION
As described in the previous section, both SP and SM
(unique per microcloud) consume more resources than the rest
of nodes, and they need to be compensated accordingly. Thus,
an auction system is required as an incentive. We propose
a multi-sided auction system between peered clients (P2P).
When the service is launched for the first time the SM is
assigned among the nodes through a 1 to N reverse auction by
the Base Manager. Once assigned, the SM assigns the SP. To
select the new SP, every node blind bids on one or more nodes.
Finally, the node with the highest bid obtains the SP role. The
use of blind auctioning increases trust from the seller being
paid fairly, given that the buyer’s perception is not affected by
other bids. As the clients move in the network, the SP may
be reallocated when one or more clients decide that, under
the current topology, the location of the SP is not satisfactory
enough for them, and request to start a new auction.
In our approach, a common SLA is proposed to the clients,
and each node gives certain importance to those characteristics
that it considers important, creating a personalized SLA. To
ease the auction, sellers expose information about their capac-
ities (information useful for the SLA). These resources include,
but are not limited to, CPUs, RAM, Probability of Failure or
Energy Efficiency. We define the satisfaction of a node as the
difference between what it required and what it gets, similar
to other works such as [13], [15]. As an example, we show
Equation 3. Here, the SLA is considered as a linear relation
between the trust that the community has on the seller, the
fulfillment of the buyer (difference between what it requests
and what the seller provides) and the distance between the
buyer and seller (in ms).
SLA = Trust ∗ Fulfillment−Distance
Fulfillment = α ∗ (reqPoF − PoF ) + β ∗ (EE − reqEE)
+γ ∗ (RAM − reqRAM) + δ ∗ (CPUs− reqCPUs)
Distance =  ∗
∑
(latn, i)
(1)
Trust represents the confidence the system has that the
seller is honest about its resources, and is set between 0 and 1.
This evaluation is made by users, according to the historical of
the service of this specific node. reqPoF, reqEE,reqRAM and
reqCPUs represent, respectively, the Probability of Failure -
probability of the system failing based on historic, between
0 and 1-, Energy Efficiency - difference between energy con-
sumed while being a client and hosting a service in the historic
-, RAM and CPUs requested by the node. PoF, EE, RAM and
CPUs represent the Probability of Failure, Energy Efficiency,
RAM and CPUs offered by the node to bid on. α, β, γ, and δ
define the relative weight of each variable. latn, i represents
latency between nodes n and i and  the weight of the distance
in the overall SLA. α, β, γ, δ, and  are configurable by the
node, to better fit the users’ requirements. This equation can
be extended depending on the users’ requirements. As stated
before, the existence of a trust evaluation is necessary to
increase confidence on the seller. If a node does not comply
with the accepted SLA (which is detected by the rest of
clients), then it will be stripped of the lease without being
paid and its confidence variable is reduced.
To reduce the possibility of sellers providing fake infor-
mation about themselves, a recommendation system is imple-
mented, where the history of sellers’ performance is evaluated
publicly. We extend the idea proposed by [11] through a voting
system, where users can evaluate the service received. A node
with a poor historical performance will receive a negative
feedback, reducing its possibilities to host new leases. Finally,
the existence of a central entity (the SM) ensures that in the
case of an irregularity (such as a misbehavior from the node
or connectivity problems) the lease is canceled and the node
hosting the service is taken the VM away and sanctioned, while
the auction process is relaunched. In order to ensure the QoE
of the clients, the SM is allowed to participate in the auction
- using credit provided by the application provider -, aligning
with one or more clients if one of the clients abuses a powerful
position over the rest.
The auction process remains unchanged but, after the
auction, the satisfaction of the users is evaluated and, if it
is found to be unsatisfactory for one or more users the SM
is contacted. While the market value of the lease remains the
same as it was decided through the auction, the SM may group
with other buyers and buy the a lease which satisfies better
all the buyers. While this solution restricts the freedom of
the auction process, it ensures that there is not a node or a
group of buyers which unfairly condition the QoE of the rest
of users. The QoE is not only necessary for users, but also for
the service owner, which improves the perception users have
of its service. This process is described in Algorithm 1.
V. EVALUATION
The aim of our experiments is to evaluate the performance
of different auction mechanisms in a microcloud-based plat-
form operating within a neighborhood, and its effect on a users’
incentive scheme. To do so, we focus on users’ satisfaction
and rewarding. Experiments have been run using NS3 [12], a
packet level simulator. We used a network of 45 static devices,
shown in Figure 1, over which a set of mobile devices (between
50 and 100) randomly move. The devices simulated in the
experiments are heterogeneous, with different demands and
offers of resources. On this infrastructure, a 45-minutes trace of
a real shared on-line document has been reproduced. This trace
has been produced for the experimentation, given the lack of
traces on multiple-users interactive Cloud applications fitting
our requirements in literature. This trace includes several users
writing and deleting on an on-line document sharing system.
15 different auctions occur during the experiments, resulting
from the mobile devices’ mobility.
On this network we use different bidding strategies for
allocating the SP. For each experiment, all devices in the
network (both static and mobile devices) start with an initial
credit of 10 units. When the VM is deployed, the Service
Algorithm 1 Auction’s External Supervision.
for all nodes do
Initialize node.bid to 0
for each node in nodes do
for each neighbor of node do
{Bid only on those nodes matching its requirements}
if neighbor matches node requirements then
node.bid(neighbor, minimumBid
+(satisfaction)*biddingMoney/2)
Initialize currentBid to minimumBid
Initialize currentAvgSatisfaction to −∞
for each node in nodes do
if node.bid > currentBid then
if currentAvgSatisfaction >= threshold AND
node.AvgSatisfaction < threshold then
currentBid = node.bid - currentBid
else if currentAvgSatisfaction < threshold AND
currentAvgSatisfaction < node.AvgSatisfaction
then
currentAvgSatisfaction=node.AvgSatisfaction
chosenNode = node
currentBid = node.bid
chosenNode.receiveBid
return chosenNode
Fig. 1: Topology of the network of static nodes
Manager automatically chooses the node which fits the needed
requirements and requires the least credit. Over time, the
mobile devices move along the network, and request a re-
allocation of the VM which satisfies them better. In our
experiments, to ease the comparison of results, we used the
SLA described before in Equation 3, and set the same values
for α = 10, β = 10, γ = 1, δ = 1 and  = 1 on each node.
Using constants for the users’ chosen variables simplifies the
comparison of the behavior of the different approaches based
on the mobility of nodes and heterogeneousness of devices.
The bidding formula used to determine the amount of
money to bid on is described on Equation 2.
bid = minimumBid+ (satisfaction) ∗ biddingMoney/σ
(2)
minimumBid and σ are set by the user. minimumBid de-
termines what is the minimum amount to bid and σ the ag-
gressiveness on which the node bids (how fast it increases the
amount of money to bid). In our experiments, a minimumBid
value, in a range between 0 to 10 credits and different for each
node, is set for each node. The value σ = 2 has been used for
all clients, to evaluate the results over similar conditions. The
bidding strategies used are:
Standard Double Auction (SDA): Each node bids on its
direct neighbors a sum relative to its satisfaction with that
node. This strategy rewards low latency and is the most ag-
gressive, as each node only accepts its maximum satisfaction.
Flexible Double Auction (FDA): It is similar to SDA
but besides bidding on its direct neighbors, it also considers
distance. To ease comparisons, delay has been considered
equal between every connection, so instead of in ms, distance
has been counted on hops. Thus, each node bids a smaller
percentage of what was bid in the previous layer of clients on
clients with a distance greater than 1 and lesser than 10. FDA
is less aggressive and less focused on latency than SDA.
Collaborative Double Auction (CDA): As in FDA, in this
strategy every node bids on its direct neighbors and those with
a distance of more than 1, but every group - set of clients which
share the node to be bid on as a direct neighbor - proposes a
common bid. A node may be part of different groups. While
every node bids less credit, their total contribution is still
significant. It rewards credit saving for future bids.
Standard Double Auction with External Supervision
(SDA-ES): Similar to SDA, but the SM has the option of
matching the biggest bid to provide a better average satisfac-
tion in the system. The interference of the SM only happens
when the average satisfaction is lesser than a threshold. This
strategy ensures that no wealthy buyer controls the outcome
of the auction in detriment of the community (that is, forcing
a low satisfaction on the rest).
Random assignment (RND): Assigns the VM randomly.
Is used as a base line for the comparison.
For the current experiments we have set a threshold of
5 units, so the average satisfaction of clients is, if possible,
bigger than this. This value has been chosen after experimental
consideration of different candidates, shown in Figure 2. For
our experimentation, five different values where considered:
threshold = 0units, threshold = 5units, threshold =
−5units, threshold = 10units and threshold = 15units.
Experiments where performed using a variable number of
participants, under the same conditions and network as the
rest of experimentation.
As it is shown in Figure 2, the use of a threshold set to
5 units performs well in all the situations. Also, it allows us
showing that the addition of external credits in the auction
produces, sometimes, feedbacks in the system. For example,
for 30 and 40 clients and threshold = 5units, the average
satisfaction remains well over the expected minimum. This is
caused because, every time an auction is corrected, some extra
credits are pushed into the system, redistributing the overall
wealth in the system.
After, we evaluated the clients’ satisfaction under the
different bidding strategies, shown on Figure 3 for a variable
number of mobile clients. Average, maximum and minimum
data are also displayed in Tables I, II and III.
Fig. 2: Client satisfaction using different threshold values
TABLE I: Average satisfaction per strategy
XXXXXXXStrat.
#Clients 50 60 70 80 90 100
SDA 1.62 5.70 -5.39 1.62 -1.31 2.53
FDA 1.62 6.49 -4.37 2.53 -1.31 3.55
CDA 0.15 -0.18 0.60 -0.29 -5.50 -3.46
SDA-ES 12.61 8.76 5.70 7.74 2.76 5.81
RND 0.72 0.49 -2.44 -1.31 -3.4 1.51
As depicted, while there is not a great difference between
using an SDA or FDA auction, collaborative auctions do
not perform well in this scenario - getting, in most cases, a
satisfaction close to the one of the random assignment. While
CDA is less aggressive and more fair between sellers, having
every user with roughly equal credit, the probabilities of a
winning bid which does not satisfy the set are bigger. However,
under certain circumstances, it may show an equal or better
performance than the two others. SDA-ES performs always
better than the rest, due to the external supervision.
TABLE II: Maximum satisfaction per strategy
XXXXXXXStrat.
#Clients 50 60 70 80 90 100
SDA 19.74 20.65 10.68 20.76 19.63 22.80
FDA 19.74 22.69 10.68 20.76 19.63 22.80
CDA 17.82 22.80 16.69 20.76 12.72 22.58
SDA-ES 25.86 26.88 20.65 26.77 19.63 23.82
RND 20.65 17.71 18.39 20.65 19.63 21.67
TABLE III: Minimum satisfaction per strategy
XXXXXXXStrat.
#Clients 50 60 70 80 90 100
SDA -14.40 -13.20 -21.36 -18.30 -17.28 -15.36
FDA -16.38 -13.20 -21.36 -18.30 -17.28 -15.36
CDA -23.17 -25.44 -22.26 -22.38 -24.30 -26.34
SDA-ES -4.37 -2.2 -9.2 -3.40 -9.24 -7.2
RND -16.42 -17.28 -21.36 -19.31 -22.38 -24.30
TABLE IV: Maximum bid per strategy
``````````Strategy
#Clients 50 60 70 80 90 100
SDA 151 120 230 241 321 341
FDA 160 120 230 260 321 341
CDA 160 120 230 260 321 341
SDA-ES 540 190 300 260 550 350
The choice of a threshold of satisfaction in a SDA-ES
strategy is of paramount importance. Choosing an unrealistic
- too high - satisfaction threshold that no node meets affects
the freedom of credit exchange, as the SM will always decide.
On the other hand, a very low threshold is always met and
the strategy is the same as SDA. Furthermore, modifying
this threshold, for example, providing a minimum satisfaction
rather than an average one has undesired effects. Due to
some users being ”unsatisfiable”, the global satisfaction is
diminished to the same level as CDA.
The distribution of credit among clients participating in the
auction at the end of the experiments is shown in Figure 4a.
Here, every block represents the amount of money that a device
have by the end of the experiment. While the distribution of
credit among clients is more balanced using a CDA strategy,
it also shows that by using a SDA strategy the total amount
of credit used in the network is smaller than in any other.
This is caused by the nature of the strategy, in which the
number of participants in the auction is smaller, as shown in
Figure 4b. This situation is caused by the unfair distribution
of credit, which leads to a small number of clients affecting
the result and reducing the number of clients involved in the
auction. For the other strategies, we have not observed any
difference in the number of clients involved. Last, the SDA-
ES strategy shows a better distribution of credit than SDA
and FDA, making the system more fair. While CDA provides
a more equal distribution of credit than SDA-ES, it has also
been shown that the global satisfaction tends to be much worse.
As expected, the case of Random Assignment is not shown in
Figure 4, given that no exchange of money is necessary.
However, using an SDA-ES strategy also increases the total
amount of credit in the system - thus, for the users -, through
external injections. This situation is shown in Table IV, where
the biggest bid for each strategy is shown. As shown, having
more credit in the system leads the buyers to offer bigger bids.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The expansion of geographically located MCs is a mile-
stone in returning the cloud to users. Furthermore, as the
mobile technologies advance and become more accessible, it
will be the best option both to absorb the needed increase in
the demand of energy, reduce the unnecessary network traffic
and to provide a near to real-time experience. However, to be
accepted by users, Mobile Clouds need to be incentivized from
the application providers.
We believe that the use of a credit-based system enhances
the perception of the MC as a local infrastructure, while the
commerce of credit between users in exchange of services
adapts the service to the neighborhood. On the other hand,
it allows users to go beyond the purely digital domain by
Fig. 3: Client satisfaction using different strategies
(a) Credit distribution among clients using different strategies
(b) Participants in the auction using different strategies
Fig. 4: Credit distribution vs. participants
exchanging this credit by real-life services. It also enhances
the adaptability of services to neighborhoods, since larger
quantities of credit in a neighborhood increases the number
of services and, thus, the credit distribution.
Also, the company obtains first hand geographically located
information. This information is of basic need in today’s world
of big data and pushes application providers into investing in
the community which enhances users’ experience.
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